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Abstract: Political hierarchies are common in human societies but absent 
among many mobile hunter-gatherers. So egalitarian social organizations 
have been attributed to limits that foraging imposes on wealth accumu­
lation. But male-dominance hierarchies characterize all the great apes, 
our nearest relatives. The absence of wealth is not enough to explain the 
absence of hierarchy. Recently this evolutionary problem has received 
renewed attention by anthropologists who argue that egalitarian ar­
rangements indicate distinctly human capacities for cooperation. Here I 
review work that challenges this view. The challenges suggest that hunt­
ing has played an important role in human evolution but one different 
than is w idely assumed: Hunting is an arena of male competition. When 
hunters target big game, the unpredictability of success undercuts hier­
archy with implications for the evolution of egalitarian societies and also 
for the evolution of marriage. I outline these arguments and then discuss 
applications to paleoanthropology as well as to the nonegalitarian pat­
terns that are so characteristic of ethnographically known hunter- 
gatherers in Aboriginal Australia.
In the hunting and gathering societies that anthropologists have 
long described as egalitarian, "differences among members, apart from sex 
and age, tend to be ephemeral" (Fried 1967:34). Substantial differences of 
wealth and power emerge in larger, denser, more settled populations usually 
associated with farming and herding; so the lack of political hierarchy among 
mobile foragers is seen to be more like the societies in which humans evolved. 
Recently some scholars (for example, Boehm 1993, 1996, 1997; Knauft 1991) 
have revived attention to the question posed by considering the human pat­
terns in a broader comparative context. Marked male dominance hierarchies
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are found among all the great apes. Like other nonhuman social organization^ 
those of our closest congeners show that power differences among individuals 
of similar age and sex can persist in the absence o f wealth differences. SinCe 
male dominance hierarchies characterize all the pongids, some of whom afe 
more closely related to us than they are to each other, male dominance hiei" 
archies probably characterized our common ancestors. The disappearance o f 
steep male hierarchies with the evolution of egalitarian societies require^ 
explanation.
An earlier generation of scholars attributed the difference between huma*1 
and nonhuman primates to sharing, "the paramount invention that led 10 
human society . . . because it underlay the division o f labor that probably 
increased early human productivity" and provided the "solution to mainte­
nance problems as the human species radiated over the globe" (Fried 1967: 
106). Boehm and Knauft also highlight food sharing and an associated array o f  
"leveling mechanisms," which they see as indicative o f distinctly human 
capacities for cooperation that enable humans to solve collective action prob­
lems that defeat other apes.
Here I dispute one part of that argument and then take advantage of the 
other. I begin with a contrarian view  o f hunting and meat sharing, reviewing 
data and argument largely from one ethnographic case, the Hadza of northern 
Tanzania who display the elements common to egalitarian foragers: men hunt 
large animals and meat is widely shared; women gather; and monogamy is 
the common pattern. I summarize work that calls into question three funda­
mental propositions about cases like the Hadza: (1) that meat sharing is a 
practice to ensure against the riskiness of hunting for a living, (2) that hunters 
provision their families, and (3) that hunters are usually monogamous because 
they can only afford to support one wife. If the case against conventional ex ­
planations for human hunting and sharing is correct, longstanding explana­
tions for egalitarian societies must also be revised. I turn to the hunting and 
meat-sharing patterns now widely documented for chimpanzees, then use: thu 
comparison to speculate on some effects that the much larger prey size taken 
by humans could have on behavioral capacities and social organization. A  
final section considers implications of this argument for hypotheses about the 
paleoanthropological record as well as for the nonegalitarian societies of sumc 
modern hunter-gatherers.
The "Hunting Hypothesis"
Human evolution is widely assumed to depend on a few  key b e ­
havioral innovations propelling other changes that distinguish (at least some) 
homuuds from other apes. Hunting has long been highlighted as the keystone 
innovation. According to the classic argument, males hunt to provide food fo  
share with their mates and offspring. Females can then afford to bear and rear 
more expensive children. Not only the sexual division o f labor but other d is- 
tmctively human patterns of cooperation arise because game animals arc la r «e 
enough to allow sharing; and hunting is risky enough to require it. Challenges
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to this scenario have continued to mount in paleoanthropology, primatology, 
and hunter-gatherer behavioral ecology, but it remains a persistent foundation 
for ideas about human evolution.
Influential syntheses in the fifties and sixties linked hunting to the use of 
stone tools, expanded brains, and the appearance of bipedal locomotion 
(Laughlin 1968; Steward 1968; Washburn and Lancaster 1968). Subsequent 
fossil discoveries showed that bipedalism antedated both the appearance of 
stone tools and marked cranial expansion by millions of years (Johanson and 
White 1979). Reappraisal of early archaeological sites led to skepticism that 
they clearly indicated hunting (Binford 1981, 1985). There is no current con­
sensus about which or even whether archaeological sites associated with any 
hominid fossil taxon clearly indicate big-game hunting (Binford 1985; Mellars 
1996), but syntheses for popular consumption (Johanson 1992; Leakey and 
Lewin 1992) continue to imply it, and arguments about the evolution of other 
human capacities, to depend on it (Deacon 1997).
Several decades ago, striking differences between the foraging strategies of 
humans and apes provided part of the warrant for the influential hypothesis 
that hunting was the key to human evolution. Since then, an expanding record 
of observations on an increasing number of populations shows that the differ­
ences were overdrawn. Among chimpanzees, one of our sister species, males 
hunt much more frequently and more successfully than previously supposed 
(Boesch and Boesch 1989; Stanford 1996; Wrangham and Bergmarm-Riss 
1990), falsifying notions that hunting separates hominids from the other apes. 
Not only can hunting be an important activity among chimpanzees, but it is a 
male specialty, refuting the proposition that sex differences in foraging strate­
gies are distinctively human (Galdikas and Teleki 1981). Moreover, among 
chimpanzees meat is almost always shared (Goodall 1986), but not with off­
spring, disproving both the old claim that "food is never shared (Service 
1962:38) among nonhuman primates and the associated assumption that food 
sharing would imply family provisioning. The chimpanzee patterns show that 
even unequivocal evidence of hominid hunting would not be enough by itself 
to imply that nuclear families are elementary economic units.
Ethnographic challenges to the conventional scenario have also mounted. 
Both new data sets and reappraisal of old reports have been used to argue that 
among people who hunt and gather for a living in low latitude environments, 
men are not usually working to provision their families. Results of research 
among the Hadza of northern Tanzania provide a specific illustration.
The Hadza
The Hadza are a small population, numbering about 750, defined 
as a group by the fact that they speak a common language and largely marry 
among themselves (Blurton Jones et al. 1992). They live in the rugged hill 
country of the Eastern Rift Valley, just south and east of Lake Eyasi, northern 
Tanzania. The climate of this region is warm and dry. Annual rainfall aver­
ages 300-600 mm, most of it falling in the six-to-seven-month wet season
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(November to May). Local plant communities are dominated by mixed savan­
na woodland, and large-game animals are abundant.
At the time of first European contact, around the beginning of this century, 
the Hadza reportedly had this area largely to themselves and lived entirely 
by hunting and gathering (Blurton Jones et al. 1996; Obst 1912). Local incur­
sions by non-Hadza pastoral and agricultural groups were recorded as early 
as the 1920s and continue, particularly in the northern part of Hadza country, 
right to the present (Woodburn 1988). Archaeological evidence suggests that 
hunters, herders, and farmers have all occupied this area, at least intermittent­
ly, for several millennia. Hunter-gatherers alone have been present far longer 
(Mehlman 1988).
During the past 60 years (and especially since the mid-1960s), various seg­
ments of the Hadza population have been subjected to a series of government- 
and church-sponsored settlement schemes designed to encourage them to 
abandon the foraging life in favor of full-time farming (Ndagala 1988). None 
of the projects has been successful, and in every case, most of the Hadza in­
volved have returned to the bush, usually within a few months. In each in­
stance, some Hadza have managed to avoid settlement and continued to live 
as hunter-gatherers.
Hadza Hunting
Hadza hunters kill or scavenge large animals at an overall mean 
rate of 4.89 kg (live weight) of prey per hunter-day (Hawkes et al. 1991). Dur­
ing one field period of about a year (1985-1986), the large prey taken by hunt­
ers gave an average of about 1 kg (live weight) per consumer per day. This is 
more than twice Lee's (1979) estimate for !Kung foragers living in the Dobe 
area of Botswana in the 1960s. Hadza underline the importance meat has for 
them by describing themselves as meat eaters (in contrast to their pastoralisl 
and farming neighbors). Big game provides a large and highly valued compo­
nent of the Hadza diet.
The high average, however, comes with substantial variation. Not only does 
the success of individual hunters vary, but there are also differences in the 
amount of meat all acquire by hunting method (intercept or encounter), ancl 
from week to week, season to season, and year to year. Intercept hunting was 
unusually successful in the late dry season of 1985, hunters earning a rale 
more than three times higher than their rate with this method in the late dry of
1986 (7.56 kg per hunter-day as compared with 2.44 kg per hunter-day; 
Hawkes et al. 1991). During the 1985 late dry, their take by all methods 
amounted to an average of almost 2 kg per consumer-day. But they averaged 
less than one-third as much over all other seasons. Variation around these 
averages is of course compounded by variation from day to day and week to 
week, as well as among consumers on any given day. The lower the camp 
mean, the more likely some residents get none.
The Payoff to the Hunter Himself for His Effort
, The avera§e accluisition rates are an obvious way to measure the 
hunter s income' for his effort. The high average seems to provide an obvi-
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ous answer to the question: why do Hadza men hunt? But counting the nutri­
tional value of the entire prey animal as the payoff to the hunter is justified 
only if he and his family consumed it all, or if he (or his family) exchange the 
portions that they don't eat for something else. The first of these is clearly not 
the case. Large prey are widely shared, a process that begins as soon as people 
arrive at the carcass. Parties of men, women, and children usually converge on 
the site, both to eat and to transport meat home (O'Connell et al. 1988,1990). 
About 13 kg (bone weights excluded) is the average size of meat shares trans­
ported to households with a resident man (Hawkes et al. 1998).1
In the sample used for that estimate, the household of the responsible 
hunter held a significantly larger share than other households for carcasses 
that contained more than 100 kg of meat, about 10% for the hunter and 7% to 
others. When the carcass contained less than 100 kg of meat, the share to the 
hunter's household was not statistically different from the share to other 
households (in this sample it was actually smaller), and the shares average 
about 10% of the total. These data are the basis for estimating that a Hadza 
hunter's household generally keeps 10% or less of the meat from his kill 
(Hawkes et al. 1998).
It could be that the rest of the carcass is the hunter's property as well; but 
instead of eating it all, he exchanges shares for shares each recipient has given 
him in the past or will owe him in the future. If so, his kill earns him the 
hunter's share plus the "exchange value" of the rest. Qualitative observations 
suggest that the meat others take is not the property of the hunter. Neither the 
hunter nor others behave as though he has a right to exclude them. The larger 
the carcass, the bigger the magnet it is to potential claimants. The style of 
claims conforms to descriptions from many ethnographers of egalitarian so­
cieties (for example, see the summary in Erdal and Whiten 1994). Classic char­
acterizations note that claimants do not say please and thank you (Sahlins 
1972) and that, in fact, there is sometimes an edge of threat. Peterson (1993) 
has labeled this pattern "demand sharing." That style is generally evident 
among the Hadza and especially salient at kill sites. Arguments sometimes 
break out about shares and their size. Claims, not just by men but by women 
as well, often take the general form of "where's mine?" The hunter who made 
the kill (or appropriated the carcass from other primary predators) plays no
evident proprietary role. . .
This appearance could of course be deceptive. While ownership is class - 
cally defined as the right to exclude other users, it also classically includes the 
right to transfer ownership to someone else. Perhaps the shares that claiman s 
take are tallied as exchanges in subtle ways that our observations miss. Eth­
nologists have long assumed that hunters share meat because, by giving up 
portions when they can, they obligate recipients to repay them when fortune 
are reversed. If shares cancel past debts and create future obligations, then tl e 
spread o f shares would trace the hunter's lines of credit. If thehunterwerehe 
proprietor of the carcass, those who were successful more often w o u l d  owe 
fess to others, have more others in (deeper) debt, and be more promising in 
vestments for the future. Better hunters should therefore give up less of th i 
own kills, receive more from others, and spend less time hunting.
Quantitative data show the first of these only under certain conditions, and 
the absence of the other two. Better hunters do not keep larger shares of kills 
that contain less than 100 kg of meat, but they do keep bigger fractions when 
carcasses exceed this size. There is wide variation in overall success rates 
among Hadza hunters. A  man's relative success rate has an effect on the size 
of his household share only when (a) he acquired the carcass and (b) it is more 
than 100 kg of meat. Better hunters do not get larger shares from the kills of 
others; and they do not spend less time hunting. They spend more (Hawkes et 
al. 1998). The quantitative patterns are mostly consistent with the qualitative 
appearance of things: no debts and obligations accumulate because the carcass 
is not the hunter's property in the first place. One pattern, the larger shares 
that better hunters keep of their own kills when the carcass is very large, 
stands out as anomalous. It is a pattern that remains to be explained.2
The Hadza observations are largely consistent with the hypothesis that meat 
is shared because it is a valuable resource that attracts many consumers who 
harvest from the carcass much as they would when exploiting any other 
valuable food resource. Hungry contestants demand "their" share and com­
plain if it appears too small. The result is widespread sharing of large car­
casses. This pattern conforms to one formally modeled by Blurton Jones (1984, 
1987) as "tolerated theft." While the label suggests to some that "thieves" are 
stealing from "owners," acquisition confers no special ownership rights in 
Blurton Jones's model. The shares are the property of successful claimants. To 
the extent this model fits the Hadza pattern, the hunter's contribution to pro­
visioning his household is no more than the share he claims for it.
Big-Game Hunting as Family Provisioning
The patterns reviewed so far do not show hunters "paying" for 
shares they receive at another time with the shares that go to other house­
holds. The only meat the hunter gets for his effort is his household's share o f 
the prey. On cursory appraisal the size of shares might look like effective pro­
visioning. But quantitative comparisons of the opportunity cost show other­
wise. The time men spend targeting one set of resources is time not spent 
taking others. The take-home rates for available alternatives can be calculated 
and compared.
The household share is a rough estimate of the hunter's contribution to 
family consumption when he hunts big game. The overall average acquisition 
rate for hunters is 4.89 kg/day (live weight; Hawkes et al. 1991). If we assume 
that the hunter's household keeps 10%, then his "take-home" rate is .49 kg/ 
day.3 Hadza men spend 4.13 hrs/day hunting on average, making their aver­
age take-home rate .12 kg/hr.
Assuming that the hunter s household keeps all small prey, the hunter's 
take-home rate for small game is 100% of his acquisition rate. Measured rates 
for pursuing small prey on encounter were derived from the participation o f 
Hadza hunters in an experiment (Hawkes et al. 1991). All those recorded were 
higher than .12 kg/hr, and those recorded for setting snares are higher still 
Men would bring home more on average to their households if they included 
small animals in the suite of prey they regularly pursue.
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The rates for large game can also be compared with gathering plant foods 
by converting kilograms of meat to calories. If large animals are estimated at 
1500 Cal/kg live weight (following Lee 1979), a rate of .12 kg/hr (live weight) 
gives 180 Cal/hr. This rate is lower than all but the very youngest children 
earn gathering (Blurton Jones et al 1989; Hawkes, O'Connell, and Blurton 
Jones 1995). In the long run, big-game hunting is inferior to available alterna­
tive strategies for provisioning families.
Moreover, this comparison of average rates actually ignores the biggest 
problem, the immensely greater variance, and so enormous risk of failure for 
big-game hunting. Perhaps one day or two without food is survivable, but 
weeks are not. Days without food push people, especially children, below a 
threshold from which they cannot recover. If women and children depended 
on food supplied by their husband or father, then a run of unsuccessful days 
would be devastating. The high average daily acquisition rates of Hadza 
hunters are due to the very large size of the prey. The average daily success 
rate, on the other hand, is .034 prey per hunter. An average hunter can expect 
a full month of failures for every day he scores. The geometric mean of arith­
metic means of weeklong runs of days would be the more appropriate eval­
uation of real nutritional payoffs for consumers depending on this food 
source. Based on products rather than sums, geometric means fall to zero 
whenever zeros are encountered. With this measure, the expected provision­
ing payoff for big-game hunting is nothing at all.
Sharing has been widely touted as a good solution to this variance problem 
(Smith 1988; Winterhalder 1986). Longstanding arguments about sharing as 
the distinctly human behavioral innovation that allows ancestral human 
groups to overcome the otherwise fatal risks of depending on the hunt are 
based on qualitative versions of the same insight (Boehm 1993, 1997; Fried 
1967; Service 1962). This assumes that the shares supplied to others are the 
price required for shares to be received from them. But Hadza men success­
fully claim equivalent shares of the kills of others no matter whether or how 
much meat they have captured in the past. A household with the hunter s 
share of 20 kg of meat may seem to pay little cost in sharing the remainder: 
How much more could its members use? But if sharing out does not affect the 
shares claimed in the future, then sharing cannot be counted as "banking" the 
"extra."
Food in general, and certainly meat, has limited life as a valuable resource. 
If it must be eaten immediately, then any more than the hunter and his family 
can eat at once has no nutritional value for them; as a consequence, its appro­
priation by others poses no cost. But in this environment, the meat not eaten 
immediately does not become valueless. Cut into sheets or strips, it quickly 
acquires a protective rind that extends its edibility. People dry meat regularly, 
planning trade with non-Hadza neighbors. They succeed at carrying off a 
bundle of dried meat to trade only when the glut of meat in camp stays ahead 
of consumption. The barrier to storing meat is not a technological one. Instead, 
there is a "social barrier" to the use of surplus meat—usually too many peo­
ple, visitors as well as residents, are ready to eat it.
Hunters' Children and Hunters' Wives
The pattern of results reported so far is inconsistent with the 
proposition that Hadza men hunt in order to provide for their families. Other 
well-studied tropical foragers display this pattern as well (Hawkes 1993). But 
even if men are not making the foraging choice that would best serve the 
nutritional interest of their households, the households are visible social units. 
There is a persistent relationship between particular men and particular 
women and children. Perhaps the hunter's household benefits enough that 
women improve the nutrition of their children by marrying hunters. In the 
Hadza case, the hunter's share of carcasses with more than 100 kg of meat is 
more than twice the size of others. This benefit is also relatively larger for 
better hunters (who already get the hunter's share more often).
Larger household shares for very large prey would not explain why men 
hunt. But given the hunting, larger shares to hunter's households could pro­
vide an economic reason for women to marry and to prefer marrying a better 
hunter than a worse one. If the advantage were small enough to disappear 
when divided with a second wife, monogamous marriage to the best unmar­
ried hunter would be a better choice than not marrying or being a second 
wife. Patterns like this could preserve elements of the hunting hypothesis lo 
explain both the continuous pairing (marriage) that distinguishes humans and 
the frequent monogamy of hunters.
To see whether a father's hunting success had a measurable effect on the 
relative nutritional status of children in his household, we analyzed a sample 
of Hadza children's weight changes over several seasons in 1985-1986. In 
some seasons the weight gains of children in households of better hunters 
were more positive, indicating that they were better nourished. The most obvi­
ous interpretation of this pattern is that better hunters feed their children more 
meat. If so, differential weight changes would have to be associated with the 
timing of father's actual kills. But they are not. Instead, the correlation is with 
father s overall success rate—which we interpret to be an index of his reputa­
tion as a hunter (Hawkes et al. 1998). It is not household meat shares that pre­
dict children's weight gains, but some other pathway links father's hunting 
reputation to the nutritional welfare of his children.
The link in this case is through wives and mothers. The foraging efforts o f 
Hadza women have a measurable effect on the nutritional welfare of their 
children and grandchildren (Hawkes et al. 1997). When Hadza mothers are 
not nursing, variation in the time they spend foraging predicts variation in the 
weight changes of their weaned children. With the arrival of a new baby, 
mothers sharply reduce their foraging, while grandmothers increase their e f­
fort, providing the nutrient stream to support their weaned grandchildren 
(Hawkes et al. 1997). If men were family providers, we might expect that the 
wives of those who provided more could afford to work less; this expectation 
is the usual argument made about the evolutionary role of hunting in a llow ­
ing husband-fathers to reduce the burden on their mates. But the Hadza pat­
tern is just opposite to what might be expected from the standard scenario.
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The wives of better hunters spend significantly more time foraging (Hawkes et 
al. 1998).
The children of better hunters do better nutritionally, not because they are 
supported by their fathers but because of the foraging efforts of their mothers 
and grandmothers. Better hunters are married to harder-working wives. This 
leaves no elements of the standard scenario unchallenged. If men do not hunt 
to provision their families and women do not gain economic benefits from 
their husbands, then the usual explanations both for men's devotion to hunt­
ing and for marriage itself are called into question.
So Why Do Men Hunt?
Why do men devote substantial effort every day to foraging 
choices that provide less to their own wives and children than to neighbors? 
In the Hadza case, people learn the story of a carcass acquisition. But the 
hunter is not the owner of the carcass. Most of the meat goes to others; and the 
size of those shares is unaffected by past (and likely future) carcass acquisition 
by the recipients. Nevertheless, adult Hadza men spend an average of more 
than four hours a day hunting, and younger, unmarried males spend even 
more (Hawkes et al. 1997, 1998). This has large consequences for the average 
diets of everyone in the community, women and children as well as men. But 
any man who took shares from the big game acquired by others while spend­
ing his foraging time gathering and taking small prey would supply more 
food to his own family. This would mean less meat all around. But the large- 
meat fraction in the “community diet" comes at a short-term cost to the diet of 
a hunter and his family. If the hunters earn some other benefit, then that might 
account for the widespread tendency of men to pay this cost.
A previous generation of anthropologists assumed that hunting and food 
sharing distinguished human from nonhuman primates. Chimpanzee hunt­
ing, known since Goodall's first report in the early sixties, was assumed to be 
aberrant or rare (Reynolds 1967). The substantial fractions of meat in the diets 
of human foragers show that hunting is an important human activity, while 
the trivial amount of meat in chimpanzee diets implied that hunting was not 
of much importance in that species (Hill 1982). Data now available show that, 
in contrast to early assessments, hunting is a frequent activity of male chim­
panzees at several long-term study sites (Boesch and Boesch 1989; Uehara et 
al. 1992; Wrangham and Bergmann-Riss 1990). Since male chimpanzees do not 
hunt to provision families, explanations for their hunting might illuminate the 
human patterns as well.
Chimpanzee H unting
Both the frequency of hunts and the time spent at it are more diffi­
cult to assess for chimpanzees than for human subjects because only active 
pursuits are clearly evident to observers. At Tai, Boesch and Boesch (1989) 
recorded 100 active pursuits over 299 observation days. Wrangham and
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Bergmarm-Riss (1990) tallied the Gombe record to adjust for various sampling 
biases and estimated an average success rate per adult male of .037 prey / 
day— a number arrestingly close to the Hadza big-game success average o f  
.034 prey/day.
The maximum benefit a chimpanzee hunter is likely to get for his effort d e ­
pends on what happens after a successful capture. The follow ing general 
sequence has been described by many observers at different study sites. Adu lt 
males near the prey rush to seize the carcass. Using threats and sometimes 
attacks, they rip the carcass apart. After this "initial division" in which posses­
sion is established, aggression is rare, but clusters of beggars surround those 
holding portions. The clusters persist sometimes for the hours required for full 
consumption of the prey. During this time possessors may refuse or ignore 
supplicants. They may allow mutual feeding on the same piece or active ly  
proffer pieces. Sometimes possessors, having fed for a while themselves, re ­
linquish the remaining carcass. In general, the larger the carcass, the more in ­
dividuals engage in attempts at consumption over longer periods o f tim e. 
Goodall (1986:373) describes "occasions when the solicitations o f b egg in g  
chimpanzees made it all but impossible for the possessor to feed; at the v e r y  
least they are a source of irritation." The descriptions show that m eat is a 
desirable food, and the acquisition of a carcass is initially a time of great e x ­
citement. Even after excitement peaks, sociality is heightened through th e 
protracted period of consumption.
Adult males gain possession of portions in the initial division, and they a re  
also most successful at begging shares from possessors. Females get less b u t 
are actively involved. Within this pattern additional biases have been d e ­
tected. In Teleki's (1973) data set from Gombe, females were both m ore lik e ly  
to beg meat from male possessors and more likely to get some when in  estrus. 
Stanford (1996) also reports meat for sex exchanges. But this pattern does n o t 
prevail generally (Goodall 1986; Boesch and Boesch 1989; Nishida et al, 1992). 
Nishida and colleagues (1992) found "favoritism of coalition partners," m ostly  
other adult males, in their long record of the sharing patterns o f one a lph a  
male at Mahale. This male was among the most successful hunters, and e v e n  
more successful at obtaining control of carcasses from other hunters. H e  
shared with males who were allies, his probable mother, and a few  other fe ­
males, but not his most threatening competitors, the beta male and the y o u n g  
males rising in the dominance hierarchy.
Nishida and colleagues (1992:160) propose the hypothesis that meat sh arin g  
is a political strategy, used to establish and reinforce alliances." Th ey  r e p o i l  
two occasions in which the alpha male himself "scarcely ate" from a large c a r ­
cass he had secured but held it "only to let other chimpanzees n ibb le m e a t  
from it until it was all consumed" (Nishida et al. 1992:172). The M a h a le  r e ­
searchers observations recall de Waal's (1982) interpretation o f the b e h a v io r  
of a male in the captive Arnhem colony. When the subordinate m ale  b e ta  
challenged the alpha status o f another male, the challenger distributed fr e s h  
leaves to become popular in the colony and perhaps to gain female s u p p o r t "  
(de Waal 1982). In light of this interpretation it is noteworthy that at Mahale 
the beta males and the rising young males who got no shares from  the alpha
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male were not excluded by his refusals to allow them shares. The young males 
"usually watched from a distance, and never approached"; furthermore, a 
beta male, described as the alpha's "major rival," "has never been seen to beg 
for meat from" the alpha male (Nishida et al. 1992:168-169).
The descriptions and hypotheses focus attention on the opportunities that 
hunting affords to display competitive standing and to reinforce alliances. It is 
a very social activity. Individuals can rarely monopolize a carcass unless they 
escape the social group, because of the demands of other claimants. First, 
other males try to grab pieces to control, and then both males and females def­
erentially press to be allowed a taste. Dominance relationships can be tested 
both in the struggle for possession of pieces of the carcass and in the subse­
quent interactions during the lengthy period of consumption. _
The burden of evidence suggests that hunting is much more than a feeding 
activity. Male chimpanzees hunt and share meat, at least in part, to ensure or 
perhaps improve their competitive standing in relation to other males. Sharing 
is inevitable partly because contests over a carcass make the cost of not sharing 
too high to pay. These costs include both physical defense and the "irritation" 
that Goodall describes from the intense attention of beggars. Meat is also 
shared to reward deference to the possessor's social standing. Those allied 
with him can benefit from his generosity. _
According to these working hypotheses, the benefits for hunting and meat 
sharing are clearly greater for males than for females. The smaller size of fe­
males limits their likely success at defending carcasses from attempts at ag­
gressive appropriation by larger, stronger males. And alliances play a larger 
role in establishing and maintaining high status for males than females 
(Goodall 1986). Even though females can hunt as effectively as males (Boesch 
and Boesch 1989; Wrangham and Bergmann-Riss 1990), males have more to
gain from it. _
In addition to explaining why hunting is a male specialty, the associations 
between meat sharing and male competition for dominance rank can also ex­
plain why males are more likely to hunt under some circumstances than oth­
ers. Stanford and colleagues (1994) show that over a ten-year observation rec­
ord at Gombe, chimpanzee pursuits of red colobus increased with (1) the 
number of males in the party, (2) the overall party size, and (3) the number of 
females in the party with estrous swellings. If meat sharing tests dominance 
rank and strengthens alliances, then males should be more likely to hunt 
when these things matter most. It is consistent with this hypothesis that the 
strongest predictor of hunting in the Gombe data set was the third of these 
variables: the number of estrus females in the party (Stanford et al. 1994).
Big-Game Hunting and Dominance Hierarchies
The Effects of Prey Size
Scholars have previously emphasized that chimpanzees only take 
small animals, whereas humans routinely hunt prey larger than themselves
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(Isaac 1978). If males in ancestral populations hunted to maintain or improve 
their competitive standing among other males, then a marked increase in prey 
size would have large effects on the relative success of alternative behavioral 
strategies.
The Hadza case is an instructive human example for examining prey size 
effects. While the success rates of Hadza hunters (.034 prey per hunter-day) 
are almost identical to the success rates of chimpanzee hunters at Gombe (.037 
prey/hunter/day; Wrangham and Bergmann-Riss 1990),4 Gombe chimpan­
zees eat very little meat while the Hadza consume large amounts. The extreme 
difference is entirely due to the difference in prey size. Colobus monkeys are 
the favored prey of chimpanzees (at Gombe and elsewhere). The mean weight 
of these prey at Gombe is 4.4 kg (with a mode of 1 kg; Stanford 1996). For a 
Hadza sample of 71 carcasses taken by encounter, intercept, and competitive 
scavenging over 256 days of observation (2,072 hunter-days), the mean carcass 
weight (adjusted when scavenged carcasses were not intact) was 143 kg 
(Hawkes et al. 1991, 1998).5 Because of the difference in prey size, Hadza 
hunters with success rates essentially identical to those of chimpanzees make 
about thirty times the amount of meat available for consumption that chim­
panzees do.
Even though meat is a small fraction of chimpanzee diets, with negligible 
amounts eaten by all but the adult males (Wrangham and Bergmann-Riss 
1990), everyone gets very excited at a kill. An increase in prey size increases 
the number and size of shares and so increases the prospects of eating more 
meat for all. Even when tools rather than teeth are used to dismember the ca r- 
cass, big animals take so long to dismember that potential consumers at some 
distance from the site where the carcass is butchered easily arrive in time to 
participate in the sharing. Among the Hadza, men, women, and children leave 
other tasks when they learn of a meat-eating opportunity and converge on the* 
carcass site. The potential for conflict over the meat scales up accordingly. N ot 
only do many individuals of mixed sexes and ages meet over a resource much 
too large to sequester, but many of the contestants are armed.
Simple conflict models designed to explain contest behavior in any species 
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982) confirm intuition that 
contestants do better over a series of encounters if they adjust their tendency 
to engage in contests with other claimants in the following way: readiness to 
fight for a resource goes up the greater the value of the prize. When costly 
injuries are likely, however, the gains go up if the general readiness to fi^ht 
goes down (for a review, see Pusey and Packer 1997).
The variation in chimpanzee sharing patterns described above conforms to 
these cost/benefit regularities. Juvenile prey are sometimes too small for cl iv i- 
sion (Boesch and Boesch 1989); a small carcass is not worth contesting. F e­
males do not participate in the initial aggressive contest for a carcass. T h ey  
would likely pay a greater cost in fighting with larger males and would b en e­
fit less from being the center of a beggars' cluster and controlling subsequent 
sharing.
The simple models of resource contest also show that when fights 
are costly to all, those who use an arbitrary asymmetry as a convention to set­
tle a contest, like order of arrival, do better over a series of encounters than 
those who do not (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982). In 
chimpanzee carcass distributions, the initial contest for possession of pieces 
usually involves a physical struggle, but after that aggressive behavior is rare. 
This difference could be entirely a function of package size; once divided, the 
pieces are too small to be worth a fight. But the persistence of the begging 
clusters with subsequent transfers under the tacit approval of the possessor 
(Boesch and Boesch 1989; Goodall 1986; Teleki 1973) suggests the possibility 
that chimpanzees are using an "ownership" convention.
The ubiquitous use of conventions is widely recognized as a human special­
ity (Schelling 1960; Sugden 1986). Reliance on salient but arbitrary asymme­
tries to determine strategies of conflict would be especially favored with fre­
quent encounters among more claimants over much larger carcasses. In the 
case of the Hadza, more people show up to claim shares, and they come fur­
ther to do so, the larger the carcass (O'Connell et al. 1990). In addition to the 
number of claimants escalating the cost of any attempt to monopolize meat, 
there is also the matter of weapons. Like all ethnographically known hunters, 
Hadza men and boys always travel armed. More claimants, plus bows, ar­
rows, and knives, inflate the potential cost of emotional display, favoring self­
control and increased emphasis on conventional settlements. In the Hadza 
example, people often raise their voices over shares of meat, but we have 
never observed a physical fight.
Egalitarian Consequences of Attention to Hunters
With larger prey size there is much more meat for all. Meat is a 
substantial component of the diets of Hadza of both sexes and all ages, so 
everyone has good reason to be concerned about hunting success. Successful 
hunters are themselves valuable resources. Hunting prowess may be among a 
man's most important characteristics. Among Hadza hunters, as in other eth­
nographic cases, mean success rates differ, showing the marked effects of skill. 
Among the Hadza, interview data confirm both that hunters' rankings are of 
interest to others and that they are quite consistent from year to year. Boys are 
especially good at ranking those in their own and just older cohorts (though— 
a matter of some initial surprise—this is not something closely monitored by 
young women; Blurton Jones et al. 1997). Some men are, and are known to be, 
much better hunters than others. They should be more desirable neighbors as 
a consequence.
The Hadza case is similar to several other ethnographically known exam­
ples in which hunting is awarded high importance. Prey size is the variable 
that propels the widespread consumption that makes the success of any 
hunter of interest to all. The contrast with chimpanzee hunting is instructive. 
Even though chimpanzees clearly value meat and are excited at the prospects
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of meat eating, individuals gain so little meat from any male's hunting success 
that many other factors affect his standing in the dominance hierarchy. The 
elevated importance that hunting has for humans makes its unpredictability 
more important as well, and both go  up with prey size. When success and 
failure have a large impact on everyone's consumption but no one can sustain 
a string of successes, dominance hierarchies are undercut.
Using the Hadza rates as the example, even the best hunter usually fails to 
score, and the least skilled and experienced sometimes succeeds. The tw o­
sided consequence, that good hunters cannot be relied on to succeed and that 
even boys can sometimes provide a bonanza for all, regularly undercuts hier­
archical rankings. Any hunter's success on one day w ill always be fo llowed by 
failures, limiting the extent to which anyone can maintain superiority over 
others. The absence of flamboyant self-aggrandizement among hunters has 
been remarked by many ethnographers (for example, Lee 1969). Anyone w ho 
brags about his superiority will have his claims soon countered by the success 
of another (Hawkes 1992).
What About Marriage?
If hunting is important because everyone has a stake in the success 
of any hunter, then households are not units o f production among hunter- 
gatherers, and marriage is not an economic partnership. Women and ch ildren 
get shares from the kills of all men, so the meat fraction o f their diet can be 
large whether or not they have a resident husband/father and whatever his 
own hunting success. The observation stimulates another question: I f  hunters 
are not paternal provisioners, why do women form persistent pairing relation­
ships with them? Among the Hadza, a surprisingly large fraction of w om en  o f  
childbearing ages, about one-fourth, are not married at any g iven  tim e 
(Blurton Jones et al. 1996). Still, as in most egalitarian societies, most w om en  
between the ages of 20 and 45 are married, The hunter's household does get a 
larger share of the very largest carcasses, but as noted above, this benefit has 
no detectable effect on the nutritional status of household members (and the 
wives of better hunters actually work more). If hunters are not p rov is ion in g  
their wives and children, then what explains the pairing of spouses that d is ­
tinguishes people from all the great apes?
 ^Comparison with chimpanzee mating systems underlines some o f  the d is ­
tinctive features of human marriage. Dominance ranking is a key va riab le  in  
the mating strategies of chimpanzee males. Alpha males can successfully d is ­
place other males seeking to mate with females in peak estrus, but they cannot 
monopolize more than one female at a time, and even one can be a p ro b lem  
when there are many insistent rivals (McGinnis 1979). A  lower-ranking malt* 
can also gain paternity if he can successfully separate a female in estrus fr o m  
the social group and lead her away in consortship (Tutin 1979). This s tra tegy  
can be so successful that Goodall has suggested selection may not cu rren tly  
favor the huge expenditure of energy and the high degree of risk in  a m a le 's  
attempts to rise to the top of the hierarchy" (1986:478).
Consortships, usually lasting no more than a few days, have been charac­
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terized as "incipient pair bonds" (Stanford 1996). But there is a very important 
difference between a human marriage and a chimpanzee consortship: the lat­
ter persists only so long as the pair remains separated from other community 
males. Whenever other males are present, those of higher rank can inhibit 
copulation attempts by lower-ranking males and solicit copulations w ith any 
female. The alpha can (almost) monopolize matings with any female in peak 
estrus, and females in that state are more likely to be in parties with multiple 
males. While the variance in male reproductive success is lim ited by the 
length of any male's tenure in alpha status and by the success of consortships, 
there is a general association between high rank and reproductive advantage 
(Ellis 1995). _ _ _
If dominance hierarchies were undercut by an increase in prey size as de­
scribed above, and that change also favored a tendency to settle contests by 
convention rather than conflict, there would be consequent changes in mating 
patterns as well. One possibility is that those changes would favor increased 
allocation to mate guarding. Modeling suggests that when males cannot gain 
a substantial edge in other forms of mating competition, they do best to de­
vote their effort to mate guarding (Hawkes, Rogers, and Charnov 1995). Sur­
prisingly, even when paternal investment has large effects on the number or 
survival of the offspring o f mates, pure mate guarding spreads against pater­
nal investment in the models. Marriage is, among other things, a public ac­
knowledgment o f a husband-wife relationship. In that sense it is a convention 
for mate guarding, a convention by which one man's claims are recognized by 
other men.
Implications for the Wider Variation
The arguments here dispute the role that hunting is usually as­
sumed to play in human evolution. If hunters don't support their mates and 
offspring, then hunting does not usher in the nuclear fam ily as the funda­
mental economic unit. The basis for rejecting that "hunting hypothesis" has 
given rise to another. The "politics" o f big-game hunting and meat sharing 
suggest that when divisible resources are large enough to be o f interest to 
many, their recurrent acquisition favors emotional control and the use of con­
ventions in strategies for conflict that avoid costly fights. Since average cap­
ture frequency generally goes down for encounter hunting as prey size goes 
up, the carcasses large enough to interest many consumers are also unpre- 
dictably acquired. A  big-game hunter cannot sustain claims of superiority.
Comparisons and contrasts between one particular case o f modern human 
foragers and a general chimpanzee composite with special emphasis on 
Gombe have been used to make this evolutionary argument. While chimpan­
zees are the closest living relatives of modern humans, the character and di­
versity of ancestral and collateral hominids, much more closely related to us, 
remain to be considered. W hile the Hadza are similar in many ways to other 
modern human populations foraging for a living in low-latitude environ­
ments, not all mobile hunter-gatherers are egalitarian. The hunting hypothesis
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developed here has implications fo r both paleoanthropology and variation 
among ethnographically known m odem  human foragers.
Some Paleoanthropological Implications
In the past few  years, advances in primatology and paleoanthro­
pology have led in contradictory directions. On one hand, the exploration o f  
chimpanzee behavior both in captive populations and in the w ild  has shown 
animals with unexpectedly sophisticated cognitive and strategic capacities. 
The more we know about chimpanzees, the more human they seem. On the 
other hand, the accumulating record of paleoanthropology includes an in ­
creasingly diverse array of hominids, modern humans representing only one, 
very recent variant. Hominids that must have differed not only from  liv in g  
species but from each other crowd in the shrinking space between ch im pan­
zees and modern humans.
H ow  did the behavior of members of these fossil taxa differ from m oderns?
If big-game hunting could undercut male dominance hierarchies and favo r a 
general use of conventions to settle contests, which hominids were b ig -ga m e 
hunters? The earliest archaeology is about 2.5 million years old. It consists o f 
stone tools in association w ith the bones of large animals and w as in it ia lly  
read to indicate both large-animal hunting and other social arrangements v e r y  
like those of (some) modern hunter-gatherers (Isaac 1978). Challenges to those 
inferences stimulated work to establish primary context and behavioral a sso ­
ciations between the tools and the animal bones at several early sites (Isaac 
1984). With those things established, archaeologists focused on w hether the 
sites indicate hunting or scavenging, whether the assemblages w ere  tran s­
ported, and if so, how far (Binford 1981, 1985; Blumenschine and M ar can 1993; 
Bunn et al. 1988; O'Connell et al. 1990; Rose and Marshall 1996).
The Hadza example (O 'Connell et al. 1988) shows that com petitive s c a v ­
enging and hunting can be coordinate strategies of carcass acquisition  fo r  
modern humans, as they are for other large-bodied terrestrial p re d a to r -  
scavengers (Houston 1979). This case also shows that women and ch ild ren , as 
well as men other than the hunter, can be involved in consumption whether or 
not a carcass is transported. For the arguments about male strategies m a d e  
here, questions of scavenging versus hunting and of transport d istance a re  
tangential at best. The primary question is how often the hominids w h o s e  b e ­
havior contributed to the formation of Pleistocene sites had access to  la rge c a r ­
casses. Certain kinds of rare events, like beached whales, have h igh  a rc h a e o ­
logical visibility (Binford 1981; Stem 1993). But it is average frequency in  the 
day-to-day lives of the hominids, not archaeological salience, that determines 
the payoffs for alternative behavioral strategies.
Note that prey acquisition rates are generally inversely related to p re y  s iz e . 
Modern humans can take small animals at surprisingly high rates even  w i t h ­
out projectile weapons (Hill and Hawkes 1983). Ache foragers in the forests* o f 
eastern Paraguay regularly take mammals in the size range o f the c o lo b u s  
monkeys hunted by chimps. In that size range (under 10 kg), A ch e  hunters 
capture an average of .66 prey/hunter-day— a rate eighteen times h igh e r  U t,m
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the chimpanzee rate.6 Even if Plio-Pleistocene hominids were not as adept at 
hunting small prey as modem humans, they might well have been more effi­
cient at it than chimpanzees are. But as long as prey are small, the number of 
consumers who can benefit from a carcass is limited. Increased efficiency at 
taking small animals would not have the effects on strategies of conflict and 
on dominance hierarchies associated with success at large-prey acquisition.
Two variables seem especially likely to affect big-game hunting and scav­
enging success rates. First is the encounter rate with prey, a function of the 
population density of large herbivores and of carnivores who provide the 
richest scavenging opportunities. These densities are related to each other and 
to annual rainfall. Using estimates of annual rainfall in the locale of the early 
hominid archaeological sites, O'Connell and colleagues (1988) speculate that 
in some settings and at some times large-animal densities may have been even 
higher than in modern Hadza territory. On these grounds Plio-Pleistocene 
hominids might have encountered large prey at least as frequently as do the 
modern Hadza.
A second variable affecting the success of Hadza men as both hunters and 
competitive scavengers is their hunting technology: bows and poisoned ar­
rows. The absence of comparably efficient weapons, perhaps until the last half 
of the upper Pleistocene (Klein 1989), suggests that success rates for hunting 
large prey may have been low until then (Binford 1985). Patterns in faunal 
assemblages also indicate a change in this time period (Stiner 1993). If success 
rates were low enough that large carcasses represented only rare windfalls, 
then other domains for male competition would overshadow hunting and 
competitive scavenging, and the benefits for emotional control and conven­
tional solutions to contests would also be fewer.
If big-game hunting appears only with behaviorally modern sapiens, the 
associated emotional control and regular use of conventions could have al­
lowed moderns to spread into environments previously unoccupied by homi­
nids. The colonization of Sahul, for example, the landmass that includes 
Australia and the continental islands of New Guinea and Tasmania, was only 
achieved by substantial water crossings through Wallacea. The construction of 
serviceable watercraft was a prerequisite, but also the patience to sail in small 
boats for tens of kilometers even if visible cues provided navigational targets 
(Irwin 1993). Levels of emotional control that permitted modern humans to 
make that crossing when other hominids did not (O'Connell and Allen 1998) 
could be the lasting legacy of big-game hunting.
Ethnographic Variation and the Puzzle o f  Australia
If big-game hunting shaped the political style of modern humans 
and the unpredictability of capturing large prey undercut hierarchies, they 
could help explain variation in social arrangements among ethnographically 
known moderns. When big-game hunting opportunities decline, it is a less 
important arena for male competition. Young men cannot escape subordinate
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status by taking large animals to demonstrate their value as desirable neigh ­
bors and associates.
Aboriginal Australia has always presented difficulties for ethnological g en ­
eralizations about egalitarian societies. For example, in the center of the conti­
nent ethnographers found hunter-gatherers in ecological settings much like 
the habitat of the Hadza in the dry tropics of Africa. Yet instead of the lack o f 
male hierarchies reported elsewhere, ethnographers working in Australia d e ­
scribed "gerontocracies" in which old men, no richer than hunters elsewhere, 
wielded power over young; and polygyny was common (Strehlow 1970). I f  
the traditional view  were correct, the view that men support their families an d  
are monogamous when they can only support one wife, then Australian m en  
like hunters elsewhere would have had monogamy ecologically im posed  
upon them (Alexander et al. 1979; Wilson 1975).
One response to the failure of Australia to fit the standard expectations w a s  
the suggestion that the greater "power" of some men allowed "socially im ­
posed polygyny" (Flinn and Low 1987). That suggestion, anomalous if nu clear 
families are assumed to be economic units and men are assumed to p r o v id e  
for their wives, is exactly the one to pursue in light o f the contrarian h y p o th e ­
sis offered here.
When people first arrived in Australia, social arrangements m ight h a v e  
been much like those seen ethnographically among hunters elsewhere. B u t in 
Australia, unlike all other continents occupied by humans, the terrestrial v e r ­
tebrate populations persisting into the Holocene included no v e ry  l a r g e ­
bodied species. Archaeologists dispute the timing of the last extinctions o f  
Pleistocene megafauna in Australia, but most agree that they antedate the 
Holocene (Allen and O'Connell 1995). Unlike the Americas, which a lso  s u f­
fered massive extinctions when people arrived, in Australia the sp ec ies  r e ­
maining after initial extinctions included no animals with average adult b o d y  
weights greater than 40 kg. And kangaroos, the only animals that large, e x p e ­
rience periodic population crashes that sharply reduce the chance that h u n te rs  
will encounter them in the arid center of the continent (Gould 1980).
With the disappearance of almost all big game, the opportunity fo r  y o u n g  
men to undercut the superiority of their elders by procuring la rge  m e a t  
bonanzas would have disappeared as well. Male competition could then tak e  
forms that allow steeper, more persistent hierarchies, even in the a b se n ce  o f  
wealth differences. Resulting social organization would still be s ta m p e d  b y  
the modern human reliance on emotional control and the use o f c o n v e n t io n s  
to settle contests, including contests over mates. But without b ig-gam e h u n t ­
ing to eclipse the prominence of senior men, the fact that they w ou ld  a l w a y s  
have prior claims and previously established allies could allow the o ld e r  m e n  
to successfully hold wives against more weakly competitive you n ger  m e n . 
The distinctive complexity of Australian marriage arrangements co u ld  a r i s e  
when mate-guarding conventions are generally in use but male h ie ra rch ie s  are 
no onger undercut by the constantly anticipated but always unpredictable 
capture of large prey.
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Conclusion
I began this essay by reviewing reasons why longstanding as­
sumptions about the role of hunting in human evolution are unsustainable. If 
hunting is an arena for mating competition among males, then it may play an 
important role in human evolution quite different than usually supposed. 
Competition in the form of big-game hunting and competitive scavenging 
would result in repeated captures of large carcasses. The size of the bonanzas 
would allow many more than the hunter to claim shares. Hunting success 
would be of great interest to all. At the same time, captures would be unpre­
dictable. A  hunter's success on one day would be outshone by the subsequent 
success of another. The value of meat to all, combined with the unpredictabil­
ity, could undercut male hierarchies and so result in the egalitarian patterns 
widely observed among mobile hunter-gatherers. In addition, potentially 
dangerous contests over large prey could have favored the use of conven­
tional solutions to settle conflict. Strategies of conflict over food that use con­
ventions could be extended to strategies of conflict over mates, with implica­
tions for the evolution of marriage. These particular ideas may prove 
incorrect, but they stem from theory and data that are compelling enough to 
justify further work.
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Notes
1. Household share weights are not equivalent to the amount consumed by house­
hold members because cooking occurs where other camp residents may join the eat­
ing, sometimes in front of houses, sometimes in public activity areas. Residents of 
other camps are especially likely to visit and "help eat" when they know there is 
meat in camp. "Visiting so-and-so to eat meat" is not an uncommon description of 
how someone spent the day. Sometimes visitors not only eat but depart with un­
cooked portions. Household share provides only a rough index of consumption.
2. The larger the carcass, the larger the party that assembles to transport meat from 
the acquisition site (O'Connell et al. 1990). It is likely that the number of visitors who 
arrive to "help eat the meat" is also a function of carcass size. Perhaps the hunter's 
larger share of the biggest carcasses is dictated partly by that expectation. Those 
known to have taken less may be more successful at parrying visitors' demands.
3. The sample of household shares measured m eat-edib le tissue only. In this 
comparison I assume that the inedible fraction was distributed in the same way.
4. The larger the prey, the rarer the captures (for encounter hunting), a pattern due 
to the systematic relationship between body size and population density. Human 
hunters achieve much higher rates than chimpanzees do for prey in the same size 
range. As noted above, Hadza rates for small animals are much higher (Hawkes et al. 
1991).
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5. The sharing sample discussed earlier is biased toward the largest prey; the mean 
estimated carcass weight for that sharing sample is 261 kg, an average of 152 kg of 
edible tissue.
6. For prey from 20 kg to 40 kg, the Ache rate falls to .06 captures/hunter-day. Two 
larger prey species sometimes taken by Ache hunters, capybara (avg. 60 kg) and tapir 
(avg. 150), are taken so rarely that no captures were observed over one observation 
period of 674 hunter-days (Hawkes et al 1982).
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